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Abstract 
Purpose – The aim of this paper is to investigate stakeholder power changes and their impact on firms' 
disclosure decisions in the Chinese stock market. Using legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, the 
paper identifies newly emerged stakeholder groups for listed Chinese firms during three distinguished 
periods of the development of the Chinese stock market. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Panel data analysis was undertaken over a period from 1995-2006 with 
an aim to examine the influence of stakeholder power changes on voluntary disclosures made by 297 
listed firms in their 12 years of annual reports. A voluntary disclosure checklist has been used for hand-
collecting data from annual reports. 
 
Findings – The finding shows that different stakeholder groups exert different degrees of influence on 
firms' decision-making in respect of information disclosure during different stages of the development of 
the Chinese stock market. 
 
Research limitations/implications – The impact of a stakeholder power changes on corporate disclosure 
has not been well addressed and how listed Chinese firms respond to these changes is still a significant 
gap in the Chinese corporate disclosure literature. In this study, the paper uses proxies to represent each 
stakeholder group, discuss power changes of each group and predict the impact of power changes on 
firms' voluntary disclosure. 
 
Originality/value – The paper identifies the new content of the “social contract” between listed firms and 
Chinese society and identifies various stakeholder groups of listed Chinese firms in the context of a new 
“social contract”. The paper predicts that voluntary corporate disclosure is the result of stakeholder 
pressures and firms use voluntary disclosure as one of their strategies to manage the firm-stakeholder 
relationship. 
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Introduction 
Corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market, which contributes 
positively to a country's sustainable economic development (Botosan, 1997; Bushman and Smith, 2004). 
With the emergence of the Chinese stock market in the early 1990s, information disclosure has now 
become an important issue in respect of the long-term prosperity of the Chinese stock market and 
sustainable development of the Chinese economy. The significant role played by information disclosure in 
reducing information asymmetry in the Chinese stock market has been highlighted by Xiao et 
al. (2004), Xiao and Yuan (2007) and Firth et al. (2007). The aim of this study is to investigate the 
stakeholder power changes over a decade and their impact on listed companies' disclosure decisions in 
the Chinese stock market. The investigation is conducted by empirically examining the voluntary 
disclosure made by 297 listed companies in their 1995-2006 annual reports and influential stakeholder 
power contributing to companies' voluntary disclosure during this period. The theoretical framework 
developed for this study is based on stakeholder theory, which considers the relationships between 
corporations and the society they operate in. Adopting this theory, we identify newly emerged stakeholder 
groups of listed companies since the establishment of the Chinese stock market. We also predict that 
voluntary corporate disclosure is the result of stakeholder pressures and companies use voluntary 
disclosure to as one of their strategies to manage the firm-stakeholder relationship. 
Voluntary disclosure is defined as the information primarily outside the financial statements that is not 
explicitly required by accounting rules or standards (FASB, 2001). Meek et al. (1995) define voluntary 
disclosures as the disclosures made in excess of requirements. They represent free choices on the part of 
company management to provide information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their 
annual reports. Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) divide annual corporate disclosure into three categories: 
1. compliance with mandatory disclosure; 
2. depth of disclosing mandatory disclosures, which is the extra information that exceeds the 
minimum requirement of mandatory disclosure regulations; and 
3. the extent of other voluntary disclosures. 
Without the distinction between the voluntary disclosures that are closely related to mandatory disclosure 
requirements and other types of disclosures, it is difficult to differentiate the information mandatorily 
required, the information exceeding the mandatory requirement and the information that has no direct 
relationship to mandatory requirements. For the purpose of this study, voluntary disclosures are the 
additional disclosures made by listed companies in their annual reports in addition to the statutory 
required information. These disclosures include: 
 information closely related to mandatory disclosure requirements where the depth of disclosing 
exceeds the minimum mandatory disclosure requirements; and 
 information that has no direct relationship to the mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Voluntary disclosures are also classified by academic researchers into three types, namely, strategic 
information which includes general corporate information, corporate strategy, acquisition and disposals, 
research and development and future prospects; and financial information, which includes segmental 
information, financial review, foreign currency information, stock price information and non-financial 
information disclosure. This includes sections such as non-financial information about directors, 
employee information and social policy (Meek et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003). 
This study is motivated by the unique information environment and significant regulatory changes that 
have taken place in the Chinese stock market since the early 1990s. The Chinese corporate disclosure 
environment has changed dramatically during the past three decades, in order to facilitate the transition 
from a centrally-controlled economy to a market-orientated one and this motivates us to investigate 
whether listed companies' disclosure behaviour has also changed correspondingly along with the changed 
disclosure environment. Since the Chinese Government launched the economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
the accounting and stock market regulatory bodies have gradually established a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for corporate disclosures by harmonizing the Chinese disclosure practices with 
international norms. Meanwhile, the economic reform has led to significant changes in Chinese society. 
An increased level of international competition and direct foreign investment, rapid development of the 
Chinese stock market, more sophisticated institutional and individual investors and the increased 
awareness of the importance of corporate governance and transparent corporate disclosure, have created 
a more demanding and challenging disclosure environment. This may have motivated listed Chinese 
companies to improve their disclosure transparency. Our main research question is therefore whether 
stakeholder power changes over the period under investigation have had any impact on companies' 
disclosure decisions. 
The information environment of the Chinese stock market is featured by first, strong state shareholding 
representation among listed companies and the conflict of interest between majority and minority 
shareholders. Second, the state government and its regulatory agency, the China Security Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) have played a leading role in the protection of minority shareholders, by pushing 
forward standards for a good corporate governance regime. In countries such as the USA, the UK and 
Australia, good corporate governance is in place to reduce conflicts of interest between management and 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and in countries such as France, 
Spain, Hong Kong and Singapore, corporate governance is in place to protect the interest of minority 
shareholders from wealth expropriation by majority family-owned shareholdings (Chen and Jaggi, 
2000; Chau and Gray, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003). Corporate governance mechanisms in China are 
designed to reduce the majority state ownership's expropriation of the interests of minority public 
investors. Although the role played by effective corporate governance in improving the quality of 
corporate information disclosure has been widely studied and supported in Western countries and family 
business dominated countries (Chau and Gray, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Bushman and Smith, 
2004; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005), the research findings may not be applicable to 
the Chinese context due to the different institutional settings in China. 
This study aims to make two major contributions to the existing literature. First, it is acknowledged that 
stakeholder theory has been used for some time to explain companies' voluntary disclosure of corporate 
social and environmental performance in Western countries (Deegan, 2002; Deegan et al., 
2002; O'Donovan, 2002; O'Dwyer, 2003). This study extends these theories to an emerging but important 
economy, namely China, aiming to explain corporate disclosure behaviour changes in the context of a 
very different disclosure environment. This environment features newly emerged stakeholder groups as a 
direct consequence of the economic reforms in China and stakeholder power changes over the years. As 
corporate disclosure develops into a more significant issue in investors' decision-making in the Chinese 
stock market, researchers have highlighted the need for further investigation into the significant change 
process that has occurred in Chinese corporate disclosure practices. There is a need to seek a more 
thorough explanation of what factors motivate companies to change their disclosure behaviour 
(Cheung et al., 2008). The impact of stakeholder power changes on corporate disclosure and how listed 
Chinese companies have responded to these changes is still a significant gap in the Chinese corporate 
disclosure literature. In this study, we use proxies to represent each stakeholder group, discuss power 
changes of each group and predict the impact of power changes on companies' voluntary disclosure. 
The second contribution to the literature is that unlike Xiao et al. (2004) and Xiao and Yuan (2007) who 
also look at voluntary disclosure made by listed Chinese companies in a single financial period, 2002, this 
study adopts a longitudinal approach in order to develop a more comprehensive picture of companies' 
disclosure behaviour change and different influential factors during different developmental stages of the 
Chinese stock market. This study divides the testing period 1995-2006 into three phases: the pre-
corporate governance phase (1995-1998); corporate governance establishment phase (1999-2002); and 
post-corporate governance regime phase (2003-2006). Rather than a simply arbitrary division, the 
rationale behind our approach is that we suggest each phase represents a distinctive stage of the 
development of the Chinese stock market and that different stakeholder groups exert different 
stakeholder power over listed companies in respect of their disclosure decisions. 
Understanding why listed Chinese companies voluntarily disclose information is potentially useful for the 
information preparers, users of such information and policy-making bodies, both in China and Western 
countries. As the information preparers, listed companies will gain knowledge of what extent, what type 
and the amount of information that should be disclosed in order to be successful in competing for funds 
on the stock market. Knowledge of the influences on voluntary disclosure will also assist users, such as 
public investors and financial analysts, to form reasonable expectations about the type and amount of 
information being made available. Understanding why listed Chinese companies voluntarily disclose 
information will enable the policy-makers in China to gauge the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
regime, compare the harmonization between Chinese accounting standards with internationally accepted 
accounting standards, and assess the ownership reforms implemented during the past 20 years. A full 
understanding of the corporate disclosure environment in China is also particularly useful for the policy-
makers in Western countries and multi-national corporations, in order to make the best use of 
opportunities to develop business in China. Furthermore, the impact of a changed corporate disclosure 
environment on disclosure behaviour in China will provide insights into the ability of Chinese enterprises 
to harmonize their corporate reporting with international corporate governance principles and practices. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section considers the institutional 
background of corporate disclosure in China. This is followed by a review of the extant relevant 
literature. The theoretical framework and hypotheses are then developed, followed by a description of the 
research method, sample and data. Results are then discussed, followed by concluding remarks. 
Institutional background 
The establishment of the Chinese stock market is the consequence of economic restructuring, including 
that of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. With the aim of raising capital funds for Chinese 
enterprises from the public and to facilitate the modernization of the operation and management of 
Chinese enterprises, some of the SOEs were transformed into listed companies via corporatization from 
the early 1990s, raising capital funds from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges through their 
initial public offerings. The unique institutional setting of the Chinese stock market is the different 
classification of shares issued and trading restrictions imposed on some shares. Shares issued by Chinese 
listed companies are classified as either A-shares, B-shares, H-shares or N-shares. A-shares could only be 
sold to Chinese investors, traded on Chinese stock exchanges in Chinese currency, with financial 
reporting under Chinese GAAP. B-shares could only be sold to foreign investors. These types of shares 
are tradable on Chinese stock exchanges, but only in US dollars and financial reporting is subject to 
IFRS. The A-shares could be further classified into state shares, legal-person shares and tradable A-
shares. State shares are owned by the central government and local government, but the ultimate owner, 
in fact, is the State Council of China. State shares are not tradable on stock exchanges, but are permitted 
to be transferred between domestic institutions, with the approval of the regulatory body of the stock 
market, the CSRC. Legal-person shares are held by domestic institutions including stock companies, 
state-private mixed enterprises and non-bank financial institutions and SOEs that have at least one non-
state owner. Legal-person owned shares are not tradable on the stock exchange; they are only allowed to 
be transferred between institutions. The rationale behind the trading restriction of state-owned shares 
and legal-person shares is to ensure the “control” of the company remains with the state-owned or state-
controlled shareholders. Tradable A-shares, representing only one-third of total shares issued, are owned 
by Chinese individual investors and they can be traded freely among domestic investors. 
After two decades of operation, some changes have occurred to ownership structures. In 2001, the B-
share market was opened up to domestic investors who have a US dollars account and in April 2005, the 
Chinese Government initiated an ownership reform program, aiming to eliminate various share 
ownership types and make all shares legally tradable A-shares (Jiang et al., 2008). Although by mid-2006 
this conversion process had been completed by 94 per cent of listed companies, state ownership was still 
the majority shareholder for most of the listed companies (CSRC, 2009). The unique ownership structure 
of listed Chinese companies has caused an agency problem, which is featured by the conflicts of interests 
between majority state ownership and minority public ownership (Xu and Wang, 1999). Majority state 
shareholders exploit minority public shareholders through misappropriation of listed companies', 
facilitated first by related party transactions between listed companies and their parent entities and 
second, by listed companies' provision of guarantees for their parent entities (Tong, 2004; Cheung et al., 
2008; Jingu, 2007; Li et al., 2010). 
The problems of the Chinese stock market have led to action by the Chinese Government regulatory 
bodies including the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the CSRC and the two stock exchanges under the 
supervision of CSRC. These regulatory companies have the main role in protecting minority or public 
investors' interests and preventing any expropriation by majority shareholders. To create a more 
attractive business environment and improve the efficiency of the Chinese stock market, these companies 
have, since the early 1990s, jointly established a comprehensive regulatory framework for corporate 
disclosure. The main role played by the MOF is to reform the Chinese accounting system from a “fund 
accounting system”, which served a centrally planned economy, to an accounting system that can cope 
with diversified ownership and more complex business transactions (Tang and Lau, 2000). In response to 
the rapidly changing business environment and development of the capital market, the MOF formulated 
a series of new accounting systems and standards based on internationally accepted accounting concepts 
and practices between 1984 and 2001. In 2006, the MOF announced the new Accounting Standard FOR 
Business Enterprises (ASBE), which consists of the Basic ASBE and 38 specific ASBEs that are 
substantially in line with international standards. The fundamental change, as a result of accounting 
reform and international accounting standards convergence, is the change of the objective of financial 
reporting and corporate disclosure in China from providing information to the government for planning 
purposes only, to meeting the information needs of users including non-government bodies such as non-
state investors, creditors and other users of financial information (Tang and Lau, 2000; Zhang, 2007). 
The primary function of the CSRC (2001) is to improve the efficiency of the Chinese stock market and 
protect investors' interests by establishing the corporate disclosure regulations and promoting corporate 
governance principles to listed companies. The two most important regulations stipulated by the CSRC 
are the Guidelines for Establishing an Independent Directors System for Listed Companies issued in 2001 
and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China issued in 2002. The former aimed 
to overhaul the insider-controlled board structure problem by promulgating a requirement that the 
board of each listed firm was to have at least one-third independent directors by June 2003. The latter 
addressed the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, the responsibilities the directors and management 
of listed companies should undertake and the importance of information disclosure. 
Review of the literature and development of the hypotheses 
In recent years, a number of researchers have adopted stakeholder theory to explain voluntary disclosure 
by companies. Stakeholder theory considers the different stakeholder groups within society and how they 
should be managed if corporations are to survive and be successful in the long run. Freeman and Reed 
(1983) suggest that the wider sense of a stakeholder is any identifiable group or individual who can affect 
the achievement of an organization's objectives, or who is affected by the achievement of an 
organization's objectives. Public interest groups, government agencies, trade associations, competitors, 
unions as well as employees, customer segments and investors, all could be an organization's 
stakeholders. Each group supplies the organization with critical resources or makes a contribution to it. 
In exchange, each expects its interests to be satisfied by inducements (March and Simon, 1958; Freeman 
and Reed, 1983). Despite the existence of different stakeholder groups, Scott and Lane (2000) believe that 
managers give their attention to certain stakeholders more than others, because of time and cognitive 
constraints. Good stakeholder-organizational relationship management has a clear instrumental value for 
companies, as the ultimate goal of corporation decisions is market place success (Pfeifer and Salancik, 
1978; Friedman and Miles, 2002). Companies view their stakeholders as part of an environment that 
must be managed in order to assure revenues, profits and, ultimately, returns to shareholders (Berman et 
al., 1999). Nasi et al. (1997), Mitchellet al. (1997) and Bailey et al. (2000) suggest that entities respond to 
those stakeholders that are deemed to be “powerful”. A stakeholder's power to influence corporate 
management is viewed as a function of the stakeholder's degree of control over resources required by the 
organization, especially financial resources (Ullmann, 1985). Roberts (1992) suggests that one of the 
major roles of corporate management is to assess the importance of meeting stakeholder demands in 
order to achieve the strategic objectives of the organization. As the level of stakeholder power increases, 
the importance of meeting stakeholders' demands increases accordingly.Friedman and Miles 
(2002) believe the expectations and power relativities of the various stakeholder groups change over 
time. Unerman and Bennett (2004) suggest that companies must continually adapt their operating and 
reporting behaviours accordingly, as the expectations and power relativities of stakeholder groups' 
change. 
Stakeholder groups of listed Chinese companies 
Prior to the economic reform launched in the late 1970s, the social expectation of SOEs was to operate as 
an integrated part of the planned economy. To legitimate their social status, the SOEs were required to 
provide stable and secure working conditions for workers and contribute to equal wealth distribution in 
society. Since the late 1970s, the economic reform and establishment of the Chinese stock market has 
dramatically changed the operating environment of SOEs, especially those that had been privatized and 
transformed into listed companies. In a market-oriented economy, enterprises rely on investors and 
creditors for capital resources. Consequently, the investment community expects more transparent 
disclosure from listed companies, in order to make more informed economic decision-making. Listed 
companies would change their disclosure behaviour due to the demands of various stakeholders, 
including public investors, creditors and regulatory bodies. Therefore, the changed disclosure 
environment is expected to motivate listed companies to improve disclosure transparency and make their 
information disclosure more external-user oriented. 
Some new stakeholder groups of listed companies have emerged in China in relation to information 
disclosure. They include regulatory bodies of the Chinese stock market, shareholder groups, a governance 
mechanism which advocates public investors' interests, creditors and the professional accounting 
association. The following section discusses the power change of each stakeholder group and establishes 
the expectations in respect of the role of each stakeholder group in companies' disclosure decisions. This 
study focuses on the period 1995-2006 and this testing period is further divided into three phases by using 
the CSRC's milestone in establishing the corporate governance regime: Phase I is the “pre-corporate 
governance phase”, including the 1995-1998 reporting periods; Phase II is the “corporate governance 
establishment phase”, including the 1999-2002 reporting periods; and Phase III is the “post-corporate 
convergence phase”, including the 2003-2006 reporting periods. These three phases represent three 
distinctive periods of development of the Chinese stock market. We argue that different stakeholder 
groups exhibit different stakeholder power and influence over companies during different periods of the 
Chinese stock market. 
Regulatory bodies 
The regulatory body is identified as a corporation's stakeholder by Freeman and Reed (1983). In respect 
of corporate disclosure, the way the regulatory body legitimizes its existence is to develop and enforce 
corporate disclosure rules and regulations that satisfy community information demands (Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2004). In China, regulatory bodies of corporate disclosure include the MOF, the CSRC and the 
two stock exchanges under CSRC's supervision. The political stake of a regulatory body in listed 
companies is that a healthy capital market serves the government's plan to further open up China's 
economy, enhances enterprise reform and attracts more investment both domestically and from overseas. 
During the pre-corporate governance phase, the function of the CSRC was to undertake an 
administrative examination, approval of listings and review of share transferring activities of the stock 
exchanges. The CSRC expanded its role to include regulation of information disclosure and investigation 
of securities fraud during the corporate governance phase, with investor protection becoming the priority 
underlying the CSRC's changing role. The regulatory body group has political power to influence 
companies, due to the use of the political process in order to ensure the political stake of the Chinese 
Government is actualized. The MOF has authoritative power over listed companies in ensuring they 
comply with accounting regulations and standards, while the CSRC and the two stock exchanges possess 
power to regulate listed companies' conduct and information disclosure. By building up a comprehensive 
corporate disclosure framework, the regulatory body group sends a strong signal that to legitimate their 
status in the Chinese stock market, companies need to continuously improve their information disclosure. 
Since 2000, the regulatory enforcement actions against listed companies that fail to provide the capital 
market with timely, adequate and transparent information has been strengthened. They now face 
thorough investigations from the CSRC and severe administrative and financial penalties such as de-
listing and stock trading suspension (People's Daily, 2005). Chen et al. (2005) and Berkman 
(2008)investigate market reactions to CSRC's actions and find investors react negatively to companies 
with imposed regulatory enforcement actions. These imposed regulatory enforcement actions constitute 
legitimacy-threatening issues, as they represent an actual disparity existing between social expectation 
and an organization's value system, and therefore is a threat to their legitimacy (O'Donovan, 2002). If 
listed companies are de-listed from the stock exchange, not only do they lose an important source of 
capital, but also their reputation in society is damaged. We then expect that when there are imposed 
regulatory enforcement actions against them in respect of their trading and disclosure behaviours, these 
listed companies would attempt to repair their legitimacy by providing extra information to the stock 
market. It is hypothesized that: 
H1. The level of voluntary disclosure is not related to regulatory enforcement actions in Phase I but 
positively related to regulatory enforcement actions in Phases II and III. 
Shareholder groups 
The ownership structure in the Chinese stock market creates different investor segments: state 
shareholders, legal-person shareholders, foreign investors and domestic public investors. Throughout the 
period 1995-2006, the ownership structure changed during the opening up of B-share market to domestic 
investors in 2001 and the non-tradable share reform in 2005. As a result, state ownership and legal-
person ownership has gradually decreased, while public domestic ownership and foreign ownership have 
all slightly increased. The ownership structure is expected to lead to changes of stakeholder power in 
respect of each ownership category's impact on companies' disclosure decisions. 
Given that state ownership leads to problems of “one dominant shareholder” and “insider control” in 
China, companies with a higher state ownership are expected to lack motivation for the voluntary 
disclosure of information to public shareholders for two specific reasons. First, it is suggested that state 
shareholders are able to obtain information from internal resources (Xiao et al., 2004) and second, 
voluntarily disclosing extra information to the stock market will enable public investors to monitor 
management's related party transactions more closely. Therefore, we expect that higher state ownership 
would weaken the pressure to make voluntary disclosure throughout the entire testing period. It is 
hypothesized that: 
H2. The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to state ownership throughout Phases I-III. 
Compared to state shareholders, legal-person shareholders are more economically orientated and geared 
towards profit maximization (Tan and Wang, 2004). Legal-person shareholders have industry expertise 
and management skills and will put pressure on companies to maximize profits in order to increase the 
shareholders' return on investment. In respect of corporate governance of listed companies, legal-person 
shareholders can monitor the management more effectively than domestic public investors, through their 
participation on the board of directors and the selection of corporate officers (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
Research findings show that legal-person shareholders have played a positive role in improving corporate 
governance and helping to strengthen the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders, 
evidenced by the positive relationships between the legal-person shareholding and valuation and 
profitability (Hovey et al., 2003; Xu and Wang, 1999; Delios and Wu, 2005). Thus, it is expected that 
legal-person ownership would play a significant role in demanding transparent information for the 
purpose of their own equity stake as shareholders. However, due to the strong state-related roots of legal-
person ownership in the early stage of the Chinese stock market (Delios and Wu, 2005), it is expected that 
legal-person ownership would not have a positive association with companies' voluntary disclosure during 
Phase I but during Phases II and III. It is hypothesized that: 
H3. The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to the legal-person ownership in Phase I but 
positively related to the legal-person ownership in Phases II and III. 
Foreign investors in the Chinese stock market are international financial institutions and as equity 
stakeholders of listed companies, foreign investors have behaved as effective external monitoring agents. 
In addition, companies with foreign ownership are more politically visible and subject to more public 
scrutiny in China. Improving disclosure transparency may potentially reduce political costs (Liu and 
Eddie, 2007). The disclosure behaviour of listed Chinese companies in the Hong Kong stock market was 
investigated by Ferguson et al.(2002) and they find that being subjected to a more comprehensive and 
rigorous disclosure environment in Hong Kong, the Chinese Mainland companies voluntarily disclose 
more strategic and financial information than local companies. Despite the Mainland Chinese being 
relatively new entrants to the competitive capital market in Hong Kong, the disclosure practices of 
former SOEs appear sensitive to external investors' information demands. Ferguson et al. (2002) suggest 
that the voluntary disclosure behaviour of SEHK-listed Chinese companies is a “showcasing” – to signal 
to international investment communities that they are willing to increase transparency and act as good 
corporate citizens in the worldwide capital market. Presumably, in line with the continually updated 
disclosure regulations being implemented in the Chinese stock market and demand from both domestic 
and international investors, listed companies in the Chinese stock market will exhibit similar behaviour to 
that in the Hong Kong stock market. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H4. The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to foreign ownership throughout Phases I-III. 
The prosperity of the Chinese stock market has attracted increasingly more domestic residents. Domestic 
individual investors are also increasingly interested in the performance of listed companies when 
investing in the Chinese stock market. The value-oriented investment ideology is becoming more 
acceptable and traders have over time become more rational and mature. The Chinese public investors 
have also progressively become aware that they can protect their interests through legal mechanisms. 
Several high-profile civil compensation cases indicate that as major stakeholders of listed companies, 
shareholders' actions can exert pressure on listed companies in the Chinese stock market in relation to 
corporate disclosure. The investment community, therefore, has gradually created a demand for 
transparency in corporate disclosure. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H5. The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to domestic public ownership increases 
throughout Phases I-III. 
Governance mechanism 
In a stakeholder theory setting, the corporate governance mechanism is one of the key strategies to help 
corporations to understand, respond to and relate to different stakeholder relationships (Unerman and 
Bennett, 2004). An implication of the corporatization of SOEs in China and their overwhelming state 
ownership is that corporate governance is very relevant to listed companies in the Chinese stock market. 
The CSRC promotes and implements corporate governance mechanisms, including boards of directors 
and supervisory boards to achieve “investor protection” (Tam, 1995, 2002; Lu, 2002). The two-tier board 
structure is to provide strategic direction and monitor the performance of corporate management and 
represent the interest of public investors in China. Prior literature shows that a smaller board of 
directors, more frequent board of director meetings, a larger supervisory board and more frequent 
supervisory board meetings, contribute to an organization's informativeness about earnings in China 
(Xiao and Yuan, 2007; Firth et al., 2007). We expect these corporate governance attributes are positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure in Phases II and III, the period during which the CSRC promoted 
and strengthened its corporate governance regime. In addition, the composition of the board has a 
significant impact on its role. An effective board should include both inside directors and independent 
directors. Although independent directors do not normally have an equity stake in listed companies, nor 
relationships with the management and employees, they provide the companies with tangible and 
intangible resources, monitor senior management and should be responsive to shareholders (Forker, 
1992; Hong and Wong, 2001). Having a board comprised of at least one-third independent directors by 
2003 is the result of the CSRC's regulation in, 2001; we expect an increased number of independent 
directors to play a positive role in improving listed companies' disclosure transparency in Phases II and 
III but not in Phase I. It is hypothesized that: 
H6a. The level of voluntary disclosure is not related to corporate governance attributes in Phase I but 
positively related to them in Phases II and III. 
H6b. The level of voluntary disclosure is not related to higher proportion of independent directors in 
Phase I but positively related to higher proportion of independent directors in Phases II and III. 
Creditor group 
Prior to 1978, the Chinese Government funded the operations of SOEs, gained the profits but also bore 
the losses as the ultimate owners of the SOEs. As part of the economic reform in China, there was a 
gradual relaxation of state central planning, implementation of various kinds of profit-sharing schemes 
and increased autonomy over decision-making conferred to SOEs (Qiang, 2003; Ren et al., 2005). In 
respect of financing the SOEs' operations, the Chinese Government in 1983 transformed the state budget 
allocations into loans, which were funded by major state-owned commercial banks. Banks in China 
formed a stakeholder group for listed companies as a result of China's economic reform. As creditors for 
listed companies, the power possessed by this stakeholder group has changed during the past two 
decades. In the early stage of the economic reform, banks were under pressure from the government to 
provide “policy loans” – subsidized lending to SOEs (Petkova, 2008). The formation of the non-
performing loan (NPL) problem was caused by the government's intervention and the inefficiency of the 
SOEs. Banks, therefore, had no power to influence SOEs' information disclosure. The entrance of China 
into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the opening up of the Chinese banking market and the listing 
of several large commercial banks, have all contributed to the changes in the operation of the banking 
system in China. Now, profit-oriented banks provide companies with loans on commercial terms. The 
banks can independently determine which enterprises they want to lend funds to and how to avoid NPL. 
We use leverage as the proxy for creditor power in this study. When banks were subject to political 
control rather than being market-oriented prior to the late 1990s, the banks neither allocated financial 
resources efficiently nor monitored the enterprises adequately. Therefore, we expect that companies' 
leverage has no significant impact on their voluntary disclosure during Phase I. With the further 
development of the Chinese enterprise reforms, the banks assumed their role as important intermediaries 
of financial resources and have been geared towards profit-seeking and avoid lending risks. It is 
hypothesized that: 
H7. The level of voluntary disclosure is not related to leverage in Phase I but positively related to leverage 
in Phases II and III. 
Professional accounting association 
The important role that accountants can play in improving business management and corporate 
governance has led to the development of a certification process for the accounting workforce (Groom 
and Sims, 2005). The establishment of the Chinese Institute of CPAs (CICPA) was a landmark event in 
developing the accounting profession in China (Tang and Lau, 2000). The CICPA is a quasi-government 
organization and reports to the MOF. The People's Republic of China Registered Accountant Law 
promulgated by the MOF in 1994 defines the scope of a CPA's role as external auditing, accounting 
consultancy work such as the design of accounting systems, performing accounting projects for 
management, providing advice on taxation, business registration and staff training. Since it was 
established, the CICPA has played a positive role in improving the quality of financial disclosure in the 
Chinese stock market (Groom and Sims, 2005). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that professional 
companies are a vehicle for the promulgation of normative rules through their members working in 
organisations. Accordingly, we expect CICPA affiliated personnel who work for listed companies would 
play a positive role in improving disclosure quality. The proxy of CICPA influence among listed 
companies in this study is the CICPA affiliated supervisory board. Required by the Code of Corporate 
Governance, the supervisory board supervises the corporate finance, the legitimacy of directors, 
managers and other senior management personnel's performance of duties, and protects the companies 
and shareholders' legal rights and interests. In respect of disclosure, the CSRC requires that if annual 
report disclosure contains any inaccurate and misleading information, it is the responsibility of the 
supervisory board to make comments on the reasons and clarify the issue for investors. Thus, the 
supervisory board is recommended to have supervisors with professional knowledge or work experience 
in law and accounting, to ensure its competency in monitoring companies' disclosure activities. It is 
hypothesized that: 
H8. The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the CICPA affiliated supervisory board 
throughout Phases I-III. 
Research method 
This study involves a longitudinal examination of information disclosure for 297 listed Chinese 
companies. To investigate the impact of stakeholder power changes on companies' disclosure decisions, 
the voluntary financial, strategic and non-financial disclosure made in their annual reports is chosen as 
the area of interest. Listed companies were selected, as they are more likely to attract the attention of 
investors who are interested in and rely upon the quality of corporate disclosure to make investment 
decisions in China (Liu, 2005). The annual report is a significant element in the disclosure process. 
Companies with a high level of value-relevant voluntary disclosure have a stronger association between 
current stock returns and future earnings than those with a low level of value-relevant voluntary 
disclosure (Lundholm and Myers, 2002). Furthermore, the level of voluntary disclosure of annual reports 
is positively linked to the voluntary disclosure of quarterly and other published information (Todd and 
Sherman, 1991; Gray et al., 1995). Companies would like to incorporate the information disclosed 
voluntarily beforehand through other sources into audited annual reports to increase the report's 
credibility (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Therefore, to a certain degree, the level of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports mirrors an organization's overall attitude towards information disclosure. 
To be included in the sample, listed companies must satisfy the following two selection criteria in order to 
test the hypotheses: 
1. must be listed continuously on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange spanning the period 1995-2006 and thus, 12 years' annual reports are available for 
examination; and 
2. must belong to an industry classification other than banking and financial institutions, which are 
subject to a different accounting system and disclosure requirements in China. 
The first selection criterion is to ensure the continuous observation of the disclosure behaviour of the 
same group of listed companies during the entire testing period to satisfy the minimum requirement of a 
longitudinal study. The second selection criterion is to ensure that all sample companies are under the 
same regulatory regime in respect of their information disclosure. In this way, the information disclosed 
by the sample is comparable. Application of the above criteria resulted in a sample of 297 companies. 
A voluntary disclosure checklist has been developed following Meek et al. (1995), Eng and Teo 
(1999), Eng et al. (2001) and Eng and Mak (2003) and it is attached as Appendix. Consideration is also 
given to the weighting or non-weighting of checklist items used in this study, and to the different opinions 
and approaches adopted by researchers in respect of voluntary disclosure weighting. While Chow and 
Wong-Boren (1987), Firth (1980), Cooke (1989), Meek et al. (1995) and Chalmers and Godfrey 
(2004) choose not to weight their checklist items, Buzby (1974), Botosan (1997), Eng and Teo 
(1999), Eng et al. (2001) and Eng and Mak (2003) take the opposite view. 
Three main reasons are given by researchers who choose not to weight their voluntary disclosure 
checklists. The first is that subjectivity could be involved in assigning weights when users' preferences are 
unknown (Meek et al., 1995). Second is the necessity for disclosure. Both Cooke (1989) and Meek et 
al. (1995) use the research findings of Spero (1979) to back up their argument. Spero (1979) reports that 
companies better at disclosing “important” items are also better at disclosing “less important items”. 
Therefore, they would be scored the same way regardless of whether items are weighted or un-weighted. 
The third reason is that weighted and un-weighted scores show similar results (Firth, 1980; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). To overcome the subjectivity problem and identify 
perceptions as to the importance of the checklist items in their study, Chalmers and Godfrey 
(2004)conducted a postal survey among equity analysts before assigning weighting to the disclosure items. 
The lack of differentiation between results based on a weighted checklist and an un-weighted checklist led 
to the abandonment of a checklist weighting approach in their study. 
Supporters for attaching unequal importance to each item in a disclosure checklist argue different items 
of information can be perceived as having different degrees of importance for the user group (Marston 
and Shrives, 1991). Buzby (1974) surveys a number of respondents and takes the resulting means as his 
weighting. Botosan (1997) refers to the SRI International Survey (1987) of investor information needs. 
According to the SRI International Survey, a summary of historical results, key non-financial statistics, 
projected information, and management discussion and analysis are as important, or extremely 
important, compared to investors' rating of an organization's background information. 
Therefore, Botosan (1997) assigns one point for each background item disclosed, two points for 
performance statistics and ratios, and three points to forward-looking information. A similar method is 
adopted by Eng and Teo (1999),Eng et al. (2001) and Eng and Mak (2003). 
In this study, we argue that a different level of importance should be attached to different disclosure 
categories and to each specific item in order to reflect the significance of different types of information to 
investors' decision-making during the development of the Chinese stock market. The method used 
by Eng et al. (2001) to score voluntary disclosure checklist items is followed. Giving different scores to 
checklist items is, essentially, an extension of the weighting system (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Criteria 
for the computation of voluntary disclosure scores (VDSs) are as follows. 
Strategic information 
One point is assigned to each “general corporation information” item, one point to each “corporate 
strategy” item if a general statement is given, two points if a quantitative statement is given, and three 
points if detailed elaboration on the strategy, with both qualitative and quantitative information, is given 
in the annual report examined. The same criteria are applied to some “management discussion and 
analysis” items, including “review of operations”, “competitive environment” and “significant events of 
the year”. To reflect the importance of “future prospects”, one point is assigned to annual reports that 
provide only a general statement about a firm's new developments, three points to annual reports 
providing quantitative information, and five points to detailed elaboration on this information. 
Financial information 
One point is assigned to financial ratios under “performance indicators” and two or three points to 
“historical figures for last five years or more”, as historical summaries of financial figures are useful in 
trend analysis (Eng et al., 2001). Only one point is assigned to all “financial review” disclosure category 
items if voluntary disclosure is found from annual reports. To reflect the importance of the “projected 
information” disclosure category, three points are assigned to any voluntary disclosure related to “cash 
flow forecast”, “capital expenditure and/or R&D expenditure forecast” and the “earnings forecast”. For 
“foreign currency information”, “stock price information” and “other useful financial information” 
categories, one point is assigned for a general statement, two points for quantitative information and 
three points for a detailed elaboration. Appendix shows the assignment of scores to the financial 
information section on the disclosure checklist. 
Key non-financial information 
One point is assigned to a general statement of information about directors' items, two points to 
quantitative information, and three points to detailed qualitative and quantitative information. The same 
criteria are applied to social policy items as well. For employee information, one point is assigned to all 
items except “data on accidents” and “cost of safety measures”. These two items are assigned two points if 
disclosure is found in annual reports. Sample companies' annual reports are examined and scored 
according to the degree of specificity of each of the information items in the checklist. The disclosure level 
of a sample organization, therefore, is the aggregation of the scores in the voluntary disclosure checklist. 
Disclosure level is represented by a VDS. 
Voluntary disclosures were hand-collected from the sample annual reports. The reliability of the VDS 
score could be measured by the stability and reproducibility of the VDS. The objective of testing stability 
is to see, after a time lapse, whether the score assigned to the same item is consistent. Reproducibility 
involves choosing a small number of the sample across the testing period and re-assigning the scores in 
order to find out whether the scores assigned and re-assigned are consistent. In respect of the stability of 
the VDS, the score assigned for the same/similar item used in the checklists constructed for the 
preliminary test is compared with the formal data collection across the three periods, 1995, 2000 and 
2005. To test the reproducibility, 30 sample companies (10 per cent of the total sample) are randomly 
chosen across 1995-2006 and a score for their annual reports is assigned for the second time. For the 
majority of cases, both scores assigned to the same companies are consistent with each other. The above 
two steps suggest that the VDS measure in this study possesses stability and reproducibility. 
In this study, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to examine the relationship between 
listed companies' voluntary disclosure and stakeholder power changes, which presumably affect 
voluntary disclosure. Control variables included in this study are size and profitability of the sample by 
following prior voluntary disclosure studies including Wallace et al. (1994), Owusu-Ansah 
(1997),Inchausti (1997), Watson et al. (2002), Hossain et al. (2005) and Akhtaruddin and Hossain (2008). 
CEO duality is suggested by the prior literature as a variable which has a negative impact on 
accountability (Xiao and Yuan, 2007), while companies employing Top ten CPA companies as their 
auditor contribute positively to their disclosure decisions (Chen et al., 2001; Firth et al., 2007). The 
following regression is estimated and detail of each variable is exhibited in Table I: Equation 1 
Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables are reported in Table II. The mean of VDS 
presents a gradual increase cross the three testing phases, changing from 1.031 in Phase I to 3.232 in 
Phase II and 5.299 in Phase III. Regulatory enforcement actions (REG) are significantly increased from 
0.003 in Phase I to 0.074 in Phase II. The phoneme is corresponding to the changing role of the CSRC 
from administrative body to a management agent with authoritative power and strengthens its 
enforcement actions again listed companies in Phase II. While both state ownership (STA) and legal 
person ownership (LEG) experience decreases across three testing phases, foreign ownership (TRB) and 
public individual ownership (TRA) present slow but stable increases. Changes of ownership structure 
among the sample over the three testing phases mirrors the opening up of the B-share market in 2001 and 
non-tradable ownership reform in 2005. However, it is worthwhile to note that the maximum state 
ownership (STA) in Phase III is still as high as 83.75 per cent, meaning that in some cases, state 
ownership (STA) is still significantly higher than other types of ownership. 
For corporate governance attributes, although there were no significant changes to the number of 
directors in the board of directors (SBOD) and number of directors in the supervisory board (SSB), the 
frequency of the two-tier meetings increased over periods, with number of board of director meetings 
(BODM) increasing from an average of 5.5 meetings in Phase I to an average of eight meetings per year in 
Phase III, and the number of supervisory board meetings (SBM) increased from three in Phase I to 
nearly five in Phase III. This means that the two boards become more active in monitoring management. 
A low proportion of independent directors (IND) in Phases I and II (with the average less than 1 per cent 
of independent directors in the board before 1999 and 2 per cent independent directors in the board 
before 2003) is due to there being no requirements for the composition of the board of directors among 
listed companies, until the CSRC required their boards to have at least one-third independent directors 
by June 2003. However, it is interesting to note that prior to the implementation of the independent 
director system by the CSRC, the maximum proportion of independent directors of sample companies 
reached 33.30 per cent in Phase I and increased to 37.43 per cent in Phase II and 60 per cent in Phase III. 
This means some have had more than half of the board composed of independent directors since the 
CSRC's regulation was issued. 
Leverage (LEV) is the variable representing creditors' influence. The means for leverage are 46, 49 and 
54 per cent for the three phases, respectively; showing listed companies in the Chinese stock market 
increased their borrowing relative to their assets to fund business operations over the period. CPA has 
changed significantly from 2.3 per cent in Phase I to 64.5 per cent in Phase III, reflecting the companies 
have positively responded to the call made by the CSRC in its Code of Corporate Governance and 
appointing board members with an accounting professional background to enable monitoring of financial 
affairs and reports. The mean CEO duality (CEOD) is slightly decreased, from 1.903 in Phase I to 1.806 
in Phase III, meaning that with the established corporate governance regime in China, more companies 
separate the role of senior management and chairman of Board of Directors, thus enabling more effective 
monitoring. 
Regression results 
Three Pearson correlation tests are conducted before regressions are run for three phases. Table 
III reveals a high correlation between state ownership (STA) and legal person ownership (LEG), β=−0.79 
in Phase I, β=−0.76 in Phase II and β=−0.75 in Phases III. Jiang et al.'s (2008) research explains that state 
ownership and legal-person ownership have several commonalities, including neither is legally tradable 
and they are usually state enterprise owned. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test is then conducted to 
further check for any multi-collinearity problem. The results show that except for the high correlation 
between state ownership (STA) and legal person ownership (LEG), there is no collinearity for other 
variables. Following Xiao et al. (2004), we run OLS regressions with either state ownership or legal 
ownership in this study. Panels A-C in Table IV report multi-variate test results for Phases I-III, 
respectively. Each panel consists of two sections. The first section shows the result of a regression model 
including independent variable state ownership (STA) with no legal person ownership (LEG), while the 
second section shows the result of a regression model including legal person ownership (LEG) with no 
state ownership (STA). 
Panel A of Table IV details the results for Phase I (1995-1998). During the pre-corporate governance 
phase, regulatory enforcement actions (REG) does not show any explanatory power, while state 
ownership (STA) exhibits a negative and significant influence on companies' information disclosure with 
a p-value significant at 1 per cent level. Thus, the higher the percentage of state ownership, the lower the 
voluntary disclosure made during Phase I. Legal person ownership (LEG) has a negative coefficient, 
meaning that in Phase I, legal-person ownership also had an inverse relationship to companies' disclosure 
but the impact was not significant. Foreign ownership (TRB) and public individual ownership (TRA) are 
both positively related to the total VDS, as evidenced by positive coefficients. However, these two 
variables do not have any significant influence upon companies' disclosure decision, which is contrary to 
our expectations. Among five variables representing public investor protection mechanism, only the 
frequency of number of board of director meetings (BODM) shows significant association with voluntary 
disclosure at a 10 per cent level. Other governance attributes including number of directors in the board 
of directors (SBOD), number of directors in supervisory board (SSB), number of supervisory board 
meetings (SBM) and proportion of independent directors (IND) show no relation to companies' disclosure 
decisions, although their coefficients are positive, as expected. It means most of the government 
mechanisms did not play any significant role in improving disclosure transparency during the 1995-1998 
periods. During the development stage of the Chinese stock market, the importance of creditors as one of 
the stakeholder groups of listed companies was not recognized. A low percentage of CPAs on the 
supervisory boards could explain the non-significant influence of the supervisory boards' role in 
improving information disclosure. This result is, however, consistent with our expectation. 
The results for Phase II (1999-2002) are reported in Panel B of Table IV. During the corporate 
governance regime phase, regulatory enforcement actions (REG) become a significant influential factor, 
showing that when companies received imposed penalties they are willing to disclose more information to 
the stock market to repair their damaged reputation and image in society. State ownership (STA) is still 
significantly and negatively associated with a firm's level of voluntary disclosure, with a p-value 
significant at 1 per cent level. Legal person ownership (LEG) however, shows a positive coefficient, 
meaning the relationship between companies' disclosure and legal-person ownership has changed from 
negative to positive. The impact of legal person ownership (LEG) to voluntary disclosure is significant at 
5 per cent level though. While foreign ownership (TRB) does not show any major impact on decisions on 
disclosure during the pre-corporate governance phase, it becomes one of the positive influential factors in 
Phase II, with a p-value significant at 1 per cent level. The higher the foreign ownership, the more 
voluntary disclosure the organization makes. However, public individual ownership (TRA) still shows no 
significant impact. Although Phase II saw the corporate governance regime as strongly promoted and 
gradually established by CSRC, governance mechanism explanatory variables still do not show any 
significant influence on improving voluntary disclosure except the number of board of director meetings 
(BODM). More board of director meetings are positively related to a higher level of voluntary disclosure. 
The result of the proportion of independent directors (IND) could be interpreted as although CSRC 
released various regulations in 2001 to require companies to have a certain proportion of independent 
directors on the board by July 2003, the regulations did not have any immediate impact on disclosure 
behaviour during the 1999-2002 period. Leverage (LEV) however is statistically significantly related to 
voluntary disclosure, with a p-value significant at 1 per cent level, showing that the more borrowing the 
listed companies have, the more information disclosure they like to make to the capital market. CPA 
shows some level of influence, significant at 10 per cent level. 
Panel C Table IV details regression results for Phase III (2003-2006). During this period, while state 
ownership (STA) becomes an insignificant explanatory factor, legal person ownership (LEG) presents a 
positive coefficient and significant results, with p-value significant at 1 per cent level. This could be the 
result of a changed composition of legal-person ownership, from state controlled enterprises in the early 
stage of the Chinese stock market, to institutional investors such as private owned companies and 
financial institutions. Foreign ownership (TRB) is still statistically significant and positively related to 
companies' voluntary disclosure, with a p-value significant at 1 per cent level, while public individual 
ownership (TRA) remains an insignificant influential factor. As expected, frequent Board of Director 
meetings (BODM), frequent supervisory board meetings (SBM) and a higher proportion of independent 
directors (IND) all significantly and positively contribute to an increased level of voluntary disclosure 
with p-values significant at 1 per cent level. Leverage (LEV) shows significance positively, with a p-value 
significant at 5 per cent level, meaning that during the 2003-2006 periods, the more borrowings 
companies have, the more information they disclose. Similar to Phase II, CPA is significantly related to 
companies' voluntary disclosure with p-value significant at 1 per cent level in Phase III, showing a 
CICPA affiliated supervisory board contributes to companies' voluntary disclosure. 
For four control variables, SIZE is significantly and positively associated with voluntary disclosure across 
three phases, meaning the larger the organization, the more information it discloses. ROA is significantly 
associated with the level of disclosure, with a p-value significant at 1 per cent level; however, it is 
significant in a negative way. This result shows that during the 1995-1998 periods, the less profit made the 
more voluntary disclosure they would make to the market. The voluntary disclosure made by poorly 
performing companies can be explained by the profitability requirements of the CSRC after their IPO 
listing. A listed organization could be de-listed if it made losses in three consecutive years. The less 
profitable could, therefore, adopt voluntary disclosure in an effort to maintain investors' confidence. This 
control variable is also significant at 10 per cent in Phase II but becomes insignificant in Phase III. 
Consistent with prior studies, CEO duality (CEOD) has consistent negative impact on disclosure 
decisions, with p-value significant at 1 per cent over the period. Auditing firm (AUD) is a factor not 
significant in Phase I but comes significantly and positively associated with voluntary disclosure in Phases 
II and III, meaning large auditing companies in China have started to play a positive role in clients' 
information disclosure since late 1990s. 
Changed influential factors over the three distinctive phases of the Chinese stock market reflect the 
changes that occurred to various stakeholder groups of listed companies. As stakeholders, the power 
possessed by public investors, regulatory agents, creditors and professional services over listed companies 
have gradually increased. Table V summarizes the influential factors regarding voluntary disclosure in 
the three phases. In respect of share ownership, state ownership has a consistent negative association with 
voluntary disclosure over the three testing phases. State ownership is the result of a unique institutional 
setting when SOEs were transformed into listed companies. This ownership structure does not truly 
represent any stakeholders' interest in the listed companies, except for the “inside controllers”. Pursuing 
profitability is not a state shareholders' primary concern. State shareholders also have privileged access 
to private information. These factors mean state shareholders lack interest in encouraging public 
disclosure. The result in this study is similar to Xiao et al.'s (2004) finding, which concludes there is a 
negative association between state ownership and information disclosure in the Chinese stock market. 
Foreign ownership, on the other hand, is positively and significantly related to voluntary disclosure 
during the 1999-2002 and 2003-2006 periods. B-shares were exclusively issued to foreign investors 
initially. Since 2001, domestic individual investors were allowed to invest in B-shares by using foreign 
currencies. Therefore, foreign ownership, in fact, represents an economic stake of both foreign investors 
and some domestic investors. As experienced investors, foreign ownership shareholders could exert more 
effective external monitoring and pressure on management to disclose more information. The use of 
International Accounting Standards when preparing financial statements for foreign investors could also 
contribute to a higher level of voluntary disclosure. In addition, listed companies with foreign ownership 
are politically visible in China. Liu and Eddie (2007) suggest those with foreign investment participation 
increase information disclosure voluntarily in their annual reports, in order to enhance their reputation 
and credibility. More extensive voluntary disclosures and a widened dissemination of financial 
information can create an impression of greater transparency in the Chinese stock market as a whole. 
Transparent information disclosure will increase an overseas investment community's confidence in 
investing in China. The result of this study provides strong support for the findings ofXiao et 
al. (2004), Liu and Eddie (2007) and Xiao and Yuan (2007). 
The corporate governance mechanisms advocated by the CSRC, aimed at improving corporate 
governance among listed companies, have played positive roles in improving information transparency. 
The political objective of regulatory agencies in the Chinese stock market is minority investor protection. 
The protection of the minority investor is one of the essential principles to ensure long-term and healthy 
growth of the capital market in China, and development of the capital market is part of the sustainable 
development of the Chinese economy. The viewpoint taken by the CSRC is that only good corporate 
governance structures can achieve minority investor protection in the Chinese stock market. The 
proportion of independent directors, more frequent board of director meetings, more frequent 
Supervisory meetings and a CICPA affiliated supervisory board, show positive relationships with 
companies' level of voluntary disclosure. 
The importance of creditors has gradually been recognized by listed companies over the years. The 
creditor group can be identified as one of the powerful stakeholders. Leverage represents financial 
structure and associated risk; the higher the leverage, the higher the risk of creditors' investment. In this 
study, leverage is significantly related to levels of voluntary disclosure over the 1999-2006 periods, 
although no significant association is found between leverage and voluntary disclosure during the 1995-
1998 periods, the early development stage of the Chinese stock market. Gradually declining “policy 
loans” and increasing commercial loans to listed companies may explain the relationship between 
leverage and the level of voluntary disclosure. The risks associated with commercial loans could also 
motivate creditors to increase their demands for information disclosure. Similar to public investors, their 
information demands are supported by the regulatory agencies in the Chinese stock market. Results in 
this study show companies with high leverage choose to disclose more information. This is similar to 
what Liu and Eddie (2007) found, but contrasts with the result of Xiao and Yuan (2007), which shows 
there is no significant relationship between an organization's leverage and its disclosure level. 
The findings show that gradually increased voluntary disclosure is the result of pressure exerted by 
stakeholders and different stakeholder groups exert different degrees of influence over listed companies 
during different stages of the Chinese stock market. The findings imply the adoption of voluntary 
disclosure to satisfy stakeholders' demand for information and voluntary disclosure has been used as one 
of the strategies to manage the stakeholder-firm relationship effectively. 
Concluding remarks 
This study investigates how the stakeholder power changes have impacted on listed Chinese companies' 
voluntary information disclosure. The investigation is empirically conducted by examining the voluntary 
disclosure made by 297 listed Chinese companies in their annual reports throughout the 1995-2006 
reporting periods. The study examines what the driving factors behind voluntary disclosures are, from a 
stakeholder perspective. The stakeholder power of regulatory bodies is gradually increased along with 
these organisations' changing role – from an administrative role to an actively regulating role. Companies 
with imposed regulatory enforcements are found to be disclosing extra information to the stock market to 
repair damaged legitimacy or reduce the legitimacy threat. State ownership among listed companies is 
the result of a unique institutional setting when SOEs were listed. This ownership structure does not truly 
represent any stakeholder's interest in the listed companies and pursuing profitability is not the state 
shareholder's primary concern. State shareholders also have privileged access to private information. 
These factors mean state shareholders lack interest in encouraging public disclosure. The result in this 
study is similar to Xiao et al.'s (2004) finding, which concludes there is a negative association between 
state ownership and information disclosure in the Chinese stock market. 
However, we find in the post-corporate governance phase, possibly as a result of non-tradable shares 
reform, state ownership loses its influence over disclosure decisions. A significant impact is found from 
legal-person ownership on their disclosure level in Phases II and III. This reflects the changing 
shareholders of legal-person ownership from strong state-related roots in the early stage of the Chinese 
stock market to privately-owned shareholders. Foreign ownership is positively and significantly related to 
voluntary disclosure in both Phases II and III. As experienced investors, foreign ownership shareholders 
could exert more effective external monitoring and pressure on management to disclose more 
information. Although domestic public ownership does not show any significant influence over three 
testing phases, some governance mechanisms which represent the public investors' interests such as an 
active board of directors and supervisory board and higher proportion of independent directors, show 
positive influence on disclosure decisions. 
The importance of creditors has gradually been recognized over the years. The creditor group can be 
identified as one of the powerful stakeholders of listed companies. Leverage is significantly related to 
levels of voluntary disclosure over Phases I and II. Gradually declining “policy loans” and increasing 
commercial loans may explain the increased power of creditors and the relationship between leverage and 
the level of voluntary disclosure. The risks associated with commercial loans could also motivate creditors 
to increase their demands for information disclosure. A CICPA affiliated supervisory board contributes 
positively to companies' voluntary disclosure. Professional association achieves their social status through 
the efforts of its members who represent it on supervisory boards. These CICPA affiliated members 
promote CICPA's objectives by pushing companies to make voluntary disclosure. 
There are three important implications of the research findings of this study. First, this study provides 
further empirical evidence to support Chinese regulatory bodies' actions in promoting and implementing 
a good corporate governance regime among listed companies in the Chinese stock market. The positive 
association between corporate governance and the level of voluntary disclosure shows that the 
implementation of corporate governance structures in Chinese companies is beneficial to investors. 
Further, the requirements on board composition and roles that should be undertaken by independent 
directors have improved information disclosure transparency. This result may help the regulatory bodies 
of other emerging capital markets to improve their countries' market transparency by introducing a 
similar requirement. In addition, the establishment of the independent director system in China involves 
CSRC training independent directors and enforcing listed companies to have at least one-third of the 
directors on board being independent by a certain date. These measures have effectively exerted the 
pressure from the regulator to implement a good corporate governance regime and have made companies 
realize the importance of the CSRC's regulations to their long-term success. They have also sent strong 
signals that corporate governance is essential to protect minority investors' interests. Therefore, an 
implication of this study is that the regulatory bodies of the Chinese stock market should continue to 
strengthen corporate governance among listed companies by maintaining the enforcement of their 
regulations. Second, the negative association between state ownership and voluntary disclosure found in 
this study provides strong support for the non-tradable state ownership reform, which has been 
implemented by the CSRC since 2005. 
Due to the lack of a “true owner” under the state ownership structure, state ownership cannot truly 
represent the state's financial stake in listed companies. Rather, “one dominating state-owned share 
monopolizes” and “insider control” agency problems are derived from the non-tradable state ownership 
in the Chinese stock market. State ownership has become an important factor which hampers the 
disclosure transparency of listed companies. The existence of state ownership provides evidence that, in 
the early stage of China's transformation from a planned economy to a market-driven economy, the 
Chinese Government was careful with the changes in ownership structure. Fear of losing control over 
listed companies is the primary purpose of having non-tradable state ownership. It is plausible that to 
improve the efficiency of the Chinese capital market, the CSRC launched the non-tradable shares reform 
in 2005. The ultimate goal of the reform was to make all shares tradable in the Chinese stock market. The 
signal sent by the Chinese Government was that the development of the Chinese stock market should 
follow market principles rather than operate under the shadow of a planned economy. Third, the 
significant and positive relationship found between foreign investment and voluntary disclosure in this 
study provides empirical evidence to support the Chinese Government's open door policy, in general, and 
the opening-up of the Chinese stock market more specifically. As foreign investors from developed 
countries have more experience and skills in monitoring companies' performance and demanding more 
information, they have played a positive role in improving disclosure transparency. By the end of 2006, 
the CSRC had fulfilled the commitments made for accession to the WTO in opening-up the Chinese stock 
market. Since 2001, foreign enterprises had been permitted to apply for listing on the Chinese stock 
market. In 2002, foreign investors were allowed to purchase state shares and legal-person shares. In 2006, 
foreign investors were allowed to make a strategic investment in the A-shares of listed companies, which 
had completed their non-tradable share reform (CSRC, 2009). The opening-up of the Chinese stock 
market will be beneficial to investors and improve the overall efficiency of the market. 
There are two issues to be noted when interpreting the results of this study. First, this study does not aim 
to measure the quality of voluntary disclosure made by listed companies. The focus of this empirical 
study is to measure the changes to the extent of voluntary disclosure over the years. Second, the empirical 
investigation of voluntary disclosure in this study is based on the assumption of stock market efficiency. 
In addition, this study has some limitations in respect of its research design and data collection. Although 
a preliminary test was conducted, and the design of the voluntary disclosure checklist referred to 
available statutory requirements and extant literature to ensure the comprehensiveness of the checklist, it 
is not certain that the checklist designed for the study has captured all possible voluntary disclosures that 
the sample of listed companies have made. It is also not certain that compiling the checklist is free from 
some degrees of subjectivity. The data was collected manually from the annual reports, according to the 
checklist, and a score assigned. Although measures were put into place to ensure the reliability of the data 
collection, it is not possible to avoid errors in selecting voluntary disclosure items and assigning different 
scores to each item. In the process of extracting voluntary disclosure examples from the sample, it is 
impossible to differentiate between the companies that have extra information but choose not to disclose 
it for reasons such as proprietary costs, and those that genuinely have no extra information to disclose. 
Nor is it reasonable to make an assumption that non-disclosure companies in this study are those that 
have extra information but do not want to disclose it to the public. Therefore, there is a possibility that 
the results of this study are affected by those companies that genuinely do not have any extra information 
to disclose. 
This study focuses on voluntary disclosure made by listed companies to the Chinese stock market. It 
investigates the changes in disclosure behaviour in response to a changed disclosure environment. The 
increased level of voluntary disclosure over the years reflects the viewpoint of preparers of annual 
reports, or the providers of the information, rather than users' viewpoints. Whether users find the 
voluntary disclosures made are useful for their decision-making has not been investigated by this study. 
Therefore, it would seem desirable that future studies address the information usefulness of voluntary 
disclosure in the Chinese stock market by exploring, first, value relevance of voluntary disclosure and, 
second, the linkage between voluntary disclosure and economic benefits. Value relevance studies are able 
to determine users' reaction to the voluntary disclosures, which could be represented by movements of 
share prices and trading volumes. Studies examining the linkage between voluntary disclosure and 
economic benefits would be able to determine whether voluntary disclosures could contribute to a 
reduced cost of capital for listed companies in the Chinese stock market. 
 
Equation 1 
 
Table I Definition and measurement of variables 
 
Table II Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 
Table III Pearson correlation 
 
Table IV Regression results for three testing phases 
 
Table V Influential factors in the three phases 
 
Table AI Checklist of voluntary disclosure 
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